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Key points
•	 Despite	a	rise	in	anti-EU	rhetoric	and	a	growing	assertiveness	
in	Ankara’s	 relations	with	Brussels,	Turkey	will	 continue	 to	
seek	closer	integration	with	the	European	Union	in	the	coming	
years.	The	current	stalemate	in	the	accession	process	has	been	
a	source	of	irritation	to	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan’s	government.	
Nonetheless,	a	complete	collapse	of	accession	 talks	would	be	
a	much	worse	 scenario	 for	 the	 ruling	AKP	party.	Currently,	
the	government	is	primarily	interested	in	keeping	the	nego-
tiation	process	alive,	rather	than	hoping	to	gain	full	member-
ship	any	time	soon.
•	 Erdoğan’s	government	will	likely	seek	to	continue	the	acces-
sion	 talks	because	 the	AKP	 is	 acutely	 aware	 of	 their	 impor-
tance	for	the	country’s	domestic	politics,	for	its	economy,	and	
–	although	to	a	lesser	extent	–	for	Turkey’s	international	stand-
ing.	The	opportunity	to	capitalise	on	this	process	will	encour-
age	 the	 Turkish	 government	 to	 avoid	 crises	 in	 its	 relations	
with	the	EU,	or	to	at	least	mitigate	the	impact	of	any	potential	
diplomatic	fallouts.
•	 Currently,	 the	 European	 Union	 does	 not	 have	 the	 power	 to	
considerably	speed	up	reforms	in	Turkey.	Nonetheless,	in	the	
event	of	a	serious	breach	of	democratic	values,	Brussels	would	
be	capable	of	delegitimising	the	AKP	on	Turkey’s	domestic	po-
litical	scene.	In	fact,	this	threat	has	been	instrumental	in	keep-
ing	 the	 authoritarian	 tendencies	 of	 the	 current	 government	
in	check.	The	AKP	 is	concerned	that	 intervention	by	the	EU	
could	seriously	jeopardise	its	standing	on	the	domestic	scene	
(despite	a	drop	in	support	for	EU	accession,	the	attractiveness	
of	 the	 EU	 among	 the	 Turkish	 people	 remains	 considerable),	
and	it	could	seriously	harm	Turkey’s	international	prestige.
•	 The	biggest	threat	to	the	future	of	the	accession	process	is	not	
so	much	that	the	AKP	could	turn	away	from	Europe	and	the	
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EU,	but	rather	that	the	EU	and	its	member	state	could	delegiti-
mise	the	Turkish	government.	For	example,	this	could	be	done	
by	radically	challenging	the	credibility	of	the	AKP	as	a	demo-
cratic	political	force.	Such	a	move	by	Brussels	could	come	in	
response	to	growing	authoritarianism	in	Ankara	or	as	a	ges-
ture	to	please	the	electorate	of	some	EU	member	states	which	
is	sceptical	about	Turkey’s	accession	to	the	EU.
•	 The	 AKP’s	 world	 view	 amalgamates	 both	 European	 values	
such	as	democracy,	human	rights	and	the	market	economy,	as	
well	as	Muslim	values	and	the	traditions	of	the	Kemalist	re-
public.	The	government	does	not	look	at	Islamic	traditions	as	
a	 source	of	 inspiration	on	how	 to	organise	 the	 state,	 society	
and	economy.	In	this	respect,	European	norms	and	republican-	
-Kemalist	 traditions	 are	 far	 more	 important.	 Contrary	 to	
popular	opinion,	 the	Europeanisation	of	Turkey	 is	not	being	
threatened	by	the	country’s	Muslim	traditions,	but	rather	by	
the	continued	influence	of	Kemalist	republicanism.
•	 Europe’s	drastically	worsening	image	among	the	Turkish	peo-
ple	 poses	 a	 growing	 challenge	 for	 the	 future	 of	 EU-Turkish	
relations.	The	causes	of	this	trend	appear	to	be	relatively	en-
during,	and	so	there	is	a	danger	of	the	poor	image	of	Europe	
ingraining	itself	among	Turkish	society.	In	the	long	run,	this	
could	seriously	hinder	political	 cooperation	between	Turkey	
and	the	EU.
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introduction
In	 recent	 years,	Western	media	 reports	 on	Turkey	have	 shown	
signs	of	a	possible	shift	in	the	way	Turkey	perceives	its	relations	
with	the	European	Union.	The	manifestations	of	this	change	in-
clude	a	slowdown	in	the	implementation	of	reforms	aligning	Tur-
key	with	EU	standards	and	the	growing	authoritarianism	of	the	
Turkish	government.	In	addition	there	is	a	tendency	to	emphasise	
Turkey’s	Ottoman	and	Islamic	heritage,	which	according	to	some	
observers	from	both	Europe	and	Turkey,	has	been	gradually	iso-
lating	the	country	from	Europe.	The	change	in	Ankara’s	foreign	
policy	could	well	be	another	symptom	of	this	shift.	In	recent	years,	
the	AKP	government’s	 rhetoric	 about	 the	EU	has	been	 increas-
ingly	negative,	 and	 their	policy	 towards	Brussels	 and	 the	 indi-
vidual	EU	member	states	has	become	ever	more	assertive.	At	the	
same	time,	Turkey’s	relations	with	the	Islamic	world	have	shown	
much	more	dynamism	than	its	relations	with	Europe.	Moreover,	
Ankara’s	policy	towards	Iran,	Israel,	Palestine,	Syria,	Libya,	and	
recently	also	towards	Egypt	has	significantly	diverged	from	the	
position	adopted	by	existing	EU	members	and	by	Brussels.	In	this	
view,	Turkey	would	 join	a	group	of	the	so	called	“swing	states”:	
rising	regional	powers	with	changing	geopolitical	orientations,	
who	 challenge	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 world	 order	 established	
by	the	West.1
This	paints	a	picture	of	Turkey	as	a	country	that	has	abandoned	
the	 plan	 championed	 by	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk	 to	 transform	
the	Turkish	state	and	society	on	the	basis	of	the	European	model.	
It	 also	 shows	Turkey	 as	 a	 country	 that	has	 abandoned	 its	 plans	
for	 integration	with	 Europe.	 In	 this	 view,	 both	 objectives	 have	
been	replaced	by	a	development	plan	based	on	Turkey’s	own	path,	
1	 More	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 “swing	 states”	 in:	Daniel	M.	Kliman	 and	Richard	
Fontaine,	Global	Swing	States	Brazil,	India,	Indonesia,	Turkey	and	the	Fu-
ture	of	International	Order,	GMF,	Centre	for	New	American	Security,	2012,	
http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1353953219CNAS_
GlobalSwingStates_KlimanFontaine.pdf
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which	involves	cooperation	with	a	variety	of	international	part-
ners,	among	whom	Europe	no	longer	enjoys	a	privileged	position.	
Similarly,	 it	 appears	 that	 European	 standards	 should	 yield	 to	
a	more	or	less	updated	Ottoman	legacy,	or	be	entirely	subordinat-
ed	to	the	ad hoc political	tactics	of	the	ruling	party	–	tactics	which	
completely	reject	diktats	from	Brussels.
Such	a	conclusion	raises	obvious	concerns	about	the	future	rela-
tionship	between	Europe	and	one	of	its	most	important	partners,	
which	(for	now	at	least)	continues	to	actively	seek	full	member-
ship	of	the	European	Union.	It	not	only	calls	into	question	wheth-
er	there	is	any	point	in	further	accession	talks,	but	also	suggests	
that	Turkey	might	be	turning	into	a	geopolitical	rival	for	the	EU.	
Given	the	lack	of	a	viable	opposition	force	on	the	Turkish	politi-
cal	scene	capable	of	dislodging	the	AKP,	there	is	little	chance	that	
current	policy	towards	the	EU	will	change	soon.
This	paper	 argues	 that	 these	 fears	 are	 grossly	 exaggerated.	De-
spite	 visible	 shifts	 in	 Turkey’s	 rhetoric,	 domestic	 and	 foreign	
policy,	 coupled	with	 geopolitical	 changes	 across	 the	 region	 and	
within	the	European	Union	itself,	over	the	next	few	years	at	least	
the	European	Union	is	likely	to	retain	its	position	as	Ankara’s	key	
partner.	Meanwhile	Turkey	 is	 likely	 to	 seek	greater	 integration	
with	the	EU,	and	it	will	do	its	best	to	prevent	crises	in	bilateral	re-
lations,	or	at	least	to	mitigate	their	impact	should	such	diplomatic	
fallouts	occur.
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i. the AKp’s Attitude to turKey’s eu 
integrAtion
Over	the	past	decade,	Turkey’s	political	scene	has	been	dominated	
by	 the	 Justice	 and	Development	 Party	 (AKP),	which	 has	 played	
a	key	role	in	shaping	Turkey’s	foreign	policy,	obviously	including	
its	policy	towards	the	European	Union.	 It	 is	 likely	that	over	the	
next	 several	years	 the	AKP	will	 retain	 its	dominant	position	 in	
Turkey’s	political	arena.	Therefore,	this	paper	will	not	analyse	the	
views	on	EU	integration	held	by	other	political	actors,	and	will	in-
stead	focus	on	the	AKP.	
Identifying	the	AKP’s	attitude	to	the	European	Union	is	a	difficult	
task,	due	to	the	many	contradictions	in	both	the	party’s	rhetoric	
and	in	its	domestic	and	foreign	policies.	On	the	one	hand,	some	of	
its	statements	and	actions	might	suggest	that	Turkey	sees	the	EU	
as	an	important	international	partner	–	perhaps	even	its	princi-
pal	one	–	and	a	key	source	of	inspiration	for	its	internal	reforms.	
Other	statements,	however,	suggest	the	opposite:	a	sense	of	alien-
ation	from	the	EU,	and	widespread	disapproval	of	EU	policies	and	
of	its	overall	socio-economic	model.
1. The AKP’s pro-European face
In	all	of	the	AKP’s	election	manifestos	(from	2002,	2007	and	20112),	
its	most	important	policy	documents	and	in	the	numerous	pub-
lic	appearances	of	AKP	party	 leaders,	EU	membership	has	been	
defined	as	Turkey’s	strategic	goal,	and	as	an	important	condition	
of	the	country’s	political,	social	and	economic	modernisation.	Ac-
cording	to	the	AKP’s	key	policy	document	adopted	in	2012,	the	pro-
EU	orientation	is	to	remain	the	party’s	priority	for	at	least	a	dec-
ade,	until	2023.3	Its	political	commitment	to	European	integration	
2	 See	AKP	election	manifestos	for	2002,	2007,	2011	parliamentary	elections.	
Available	at	http://www.tbmm.gov.tr	and	http://www.akparti.org.tr
3	 Source:	Political	vision	of	AK	Party,	2023.	Politics,	Society	and	the	World.	
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also	manifests	itself	in	Turkey’s	diplomacy.	For	ten	years,	Ankara	
has	painstakingly	tried	to	persuade	the	EU	to	accelerate	accession	
negotiations.	 Initially	 these	 efforts	 were	 made,	 despite	 opposi-
tion	from	a	substantial	part	of	its	electorate.4	To	achieve	this	goal,	
Ankara	 was	 prepared	 to	 take	 controvertial	 steps,	 for	 example	
when	the	government	chose	to	back	the	Annan	Plan	for	Cyprus.	
It	maintained	its	commitment	to	EU	membership	despite	the	EU’s	
uncompromising	position	in	negotiations,	which	both	the	Turkish	
people	and	the	government	often	saw	as	humiliating	and	unjust.	
This	subsequently	raised	the	risk	of	accusations	that	the	govern-
ment	was	too	docile	in	dealing	with	Brussels.	But	Ankara	did	not	
give	up	its	EU	ambitions,	even	when	some	EU	member	states	be-
gan	questioning	Turkey’s	European	status.
The	 AKP’s	 dedication	 to	 the	 cause	 of	 Europeanisation	was	 also	
visible	 in	 the	 scope	of	 internal	 reforms	undertaken	by	 the	gov-
ernment	 of	 Prime	Minister	 Recep	 Tayyip	 Erdoğan,	which	 have	
without	 a	 doubt	 brought	 Turkey	 closer	 to	 the	 European	model	
during	the	eleven	years	AKP	has	been	in	power	since	2002.	Dur-
ing	this	time,	the	army’s	influence	on	the	country’s	political	 life	
was	curbed	dramatically.	Considering	that	there	had	previously	
been	no	 civilian	 control	 over	 the	military,	 and	military	 leaders	
were	the	dominant	actors	on	Turkey’s	political	scene,	the	changes	
introduced	by	the	AKP	could	be	described	as	revolutionary.	The	
government	also	took	measures	to	improve	the	situation	of	reli-
gious	and	ethnic	minorities	in	the	country	(especially	the	Kurds)	
and	improved	Turkey’s	human	rights	record.	Significant	reforms	
were	 implemented	 in	 the	 judicial	 system	 and	 public	 adminis-
tration.	 Progress	was	 also	made	 in	most	 areas	 of	 the	 EU	acquis	
http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/akparti2023siyasivizyonu-
ingilizce.pdf
4	 When	the	AKP	won	its	first	elections,	support	for	EU	membership	among	its	
electorate	reached	52%,	making	the	AKP	voters	one	of	the	most	Eurosceptic	
electorates	 in	 the	2002	elections.	Ali	Çarkoğlu,	 ‘Who	wants	 full	EU	mem-
bership?’	in	A.	Çarkoğlu,	B.	Rubbin	(eds.),	Turkey	and	the	European	Union:	
domestic	politics,	economic	integration	and	international	dynamics,	Cass,	
London,	2004,	p.	174.
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covered	in	accession	talks,	even	after	some	negotiation	chapters	
were	blocked,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	 the	 free	movement	 of	
goods,	financial	services	and	agriculture.	The	party	leadership’s	
declaration	that	Turkey	would	align	its	legislation	with	the	stand-
ards	enshrined	 in	 the	acquis communautaire	 even	 if	 the	country	
was	refused	EU	membership	could	indicate	that	the	AKP	sees	the	
European	state	model	and	European	values	at	least	as	an	impor-
tant	source	of	inspiration.
2. The AKP’s anti-European face
Alongside	the	many	arguments	that	might	indicate	that	the	AKP	
is	committed	to	European	values	and	to	the	integration	process,	
there	are	also	a	number	of	reasons	why	this	conclusion	might	be	
misleading.
They	 include	 the	 growing	 assertiveness	 of	 Ankara’s	 policy	 to-
wards	the	EU,	and	even	a	growing	tendency	to	criticise	the	EU	for	
the	following	reasons:
•	 the	way	in	which	it	treats	Turkey	(blocking	the	accession	pro-
cess,	tolerating	the	PKK’s	presence	in	the	EU),
•	 the	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 adhering	 to	 its	 own	 values	 (for	
example,	by	implicitly	supporting	a	military	coup	in	Egypt),
•	 its	policy	towards	the	Islamic	world	(with	accompanying	sus-
picions	of	‘Islamophobia’5),
5	 The	Turkish	government,	as	well	as	some	media	and	non-governmental	or-
ganisations,	have	been	actively	promoting	the	view	that	there	is	rising	Is-
lamophobia	in	the	West,	and	especially	in	Europe.	As	part	of	the	campaign,	
its	promoters	have	organised	numerous	conferences	and	seminars,	and	is-
sued	publications	on	the	topic.	Cases	of	intolerance	towards	Islam	in	Europe	
are	 reported	 in	Turkish	media	 very	 frequently.	 It	 appears	 that	 this	 cam-
paign	has	been	 instrumental	 in	convincing	Turkish	public	opinion	of	 the	
intolerance	of	the	European	people,	and	of	the	growing	civilisational	divide	
between	Europe	and	the	Islamic	world.
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•	 ineffective	economic	policies	(which	caused	the	recent	finan-
cial	crisis).
Over	the	past	few	years,	the	pace	of	implementing	the	reforms	re-
quired	for	EU	membership	has	been	slowing	down	in	Turkey.
Ankara’s	neglect	of	political	relations	with	the	EU,	however,	are	in	
direct	contrast	to	the	dynamic	development	of	its	relations	with	
the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(MENA)	that	began	in	the	mid-
dle	of	the	last	decade.	In	addition,	Ankara	has	established	good	re-
lations	with	Hamas,	blacklisted	by	the	EU	as	a	terrorist	organisa-
tion.	It	has	also	maintained	friendly	relations	with	Iran	and	Syria	
(before	the	outbreak	of	the	latter’s	civil	war	in	2011).	More	recently	
Ankara	has	offered	its	support	to	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	which	
the	EU	and	its	member	states	have	been	viewing	with	suspicion.	
Furthermore,	in	its	foreign	policy,	the	AKP	has	been	increasingly	
drawing	on	Turkey’s	Ottoman	and	Islamic	legacies.
On	the	domestic	 front,	 the	AKP’s	 third	term	in	government	has	
been	marked	by	growing	authoritarianism.	This	has	been	dem-
onstrated	by	the	civil	crisis	 following	the	Gezi	Park	protests,	as	
well	as	by	restricting	the	press	freedom.6	This	might	suggest	that	
Erdoğan’s	party	has	been	increasingly	ignoring	the	norms	of	lib-
eral	democracy	promoted	by	 the	EU,	and	 that	 the	government’s	
official	pro-integration	stance	is	being	treated	merely	instrumen-
tally	 and	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 a	 genuine	 feeling	 of	 belonging	 to	
a	European	community	of	values.	To	some,	these	suspicions	are	
further	 strengthened	by	 the	political	 lineage	of	 the	AKP.	 In	 the	
1990s,	 the	most	 prominent	members	 of	 the	AKP	 leadership	 be-
longed	to	the	Islamist	movement	Millî	Görüş	(‘National	View’)	and	
the	Welfare	Party,	which	formed	a	government	between	1996	and	
6	 The	problems	with	press	freedom	in	Turkey	do	not	stem	so	much	from	di-
rect	government	pressure	on	publishers	as	from	the	fact	 that	most	media	
companies	in	the	country	are	owned	by	corporations	which	also	operate	in	
other	areas,	such	as	construction.	These	corporations	bid	for	large	state	con-
tracts,	and	in	order	to	win	them,	they	tend	to	apply	self-censorship.
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1997	under	the	leadership	of	Prime	Minister	Necmettin	Erbakan.	
Erbakan	tried	to	break	the	tradition	of	foreign	policy	based	on	an	
alliance	with	the	West,	which	in	his	opinion	belonged	to	a	differ-
ent	civilisational	sphere.	Instead,	he	urged	closer	ties	with	the	Is-
lamic	world.	In	1997,	Erbakan’s	cabinet	resigned	under	pressure	
from	the	military,	which	believed	that	the	rule	of	the	Islamist	gov-
ernment	posed	a	threat	to	Turkey’s	secularism.	Soon	after,	several	
members	of	the	disbanded	party,	including	the	current	president,	
prime	minister	and	deputy	prime	minister,	broke	their	links	with	
their	former	colleagues,	and	in	2001	established	a	new	party,	the	
AKP,	which	supported	Turkey’s	integration	with	the	EU.	To	many	
observers	it	remains	unclear	whether	this	move	was	motivated	by	
a	true	commitment	to	European	values,	or	whether	the	politicians	
in	question	simply	wanted	to	ensure	that	they	did	not	share	the	
fate	of	Erbakan’s	government.
3. The AKP: a European-Islamic-Kemalist mix
Taking	the	above	into	account,	 it	would	be	erroneous	to	see	the	
AKP	as	a	uniquely	European	force	that	fully	shares	all	the	values	
of	 the	European	Union.	Such	a	 conclusion	would	 fail	 to	explain	
Ankara’s	choice	to	act	in	a	way	that	has	reduced	its	chances	of	EU	
membership,	its	use	of	rhetoric	that	has	worsened	Turkey’s	politi-
cal	relations	with	Brussels	and	continues	to	undermine	the	EU’s	
image	in	Turkish	society,	which	reduces	the	likelihood	of	integra-
tion	with	the	EU	even	further.
Nonetheless,	 it	would	be	 equally	 remiss	 to	describe	 the	AKP	as	
a	party	which	sees	 Islam	and	 the	accomplishments	of	 the	Otto-
man	Empire	as	its	main	source	of	inspiration.	It	would	be	wrong	
to	argue	that	the	AKP’s	support	for	EU	integration	is	just	a	cover	
for	the	pursuit	of	an	‘Islamic	agenda’	and	its	undemocratic	means	
of	dealing	with	political	rivals.	So	far,	the	AKP’s	references	to	Tur-
key’s	Ottoman	heritage	have	been	superficial	and	rather	inciden-
tal;	they	could	be	interpreted	as	a	natural	process	of	rediscovering	
a	 forgotten	part	of	Turkey’s	history	and	as	 an	attempt	 to	 create	
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a	national	narrative	uniting	a	multi-ethnic	society	and	creating	
a	sense	of	pride	among	the	Turkish	people.
With	regard	to	Islam,	the	AKP’s	policies	have	focused	not	on	im-
posing	the	Islamic	moral	code	on	the	whole	society,	but	rather	on	
abolishing	 the	 restrictions	 imposed	 by	 the	 Kemalist	 system	 on	
the	religious	practices	of	the	majority	of	Turkey’s	Sunni	Muslims.	
The	 attempts	 to	 impose	 Islamic	 norms	 on	 Turkish	 society	 have	
so	 far	 been	 incidental:	 these	 have	 included	 partial	 restrictions	
on	 the	marketing	of	alcohol,	a	 subsequently	abandoned	attempt	
to	 criminalise	 adultery,	 and	 a	 political	 campaign	 against	 abor-
tion	 (although	 under	 public	 pressure	 the	 government	 stepped	
back	 from	 introducing	 legal	 restrictions	 on	 it).	 However,	 these	
cases	do	not	amount	to	a	comprehensive	and	consistent	policy	of	
Islamising	public	 life.	 It	seems	that	for	Erdoğan’s	party,	Muslim	
values	should	guide	the	spiritual	lives	and	the	moral	compass	of	
individuals	rather	 than	 the	public	 sphere.	 It	has	 to	be	admitted	
though,	that	to	some	extent	Islamic	values	have	influenced	Tur-
key’s	foreign	policy,	as	manifested	by	Ankara’s	growing	involve-
ment	 in	 the	affairs	of	 the	Middle	East.	Nonetheless,	 the	 Islamic	
and	Ottoman	traditions	have	not	been	particularly	influential	in	
the	AKP’s	efforts	to	develop	a	new	socio-political	or	institutional	
model	for	Turkey.7
In	 addition,	 the	 view	 that	 Turkey’s	 EU	 integration	 agenda	 has	
purely	 instrumental	 foundations	 fails	 to	 explain	Ankara’s	 rela-
tively	consistent	efforts	at	political	and	economic	integration	with	
7	 The	influence	of	Islamic	ideology	on	the	AKP’s	domestic	policies	can	be	seen	
in	 the	 government’s	 resistance	 to	 accepting	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 10	million-
strong	Alevi	minority,	who	are	calling	for	the	recognition	of	their	beliefs	as	
a	separate	religion	and	demand	the	same	rights	as	those	granted	to	Sunni	
Muslims.	It	seems	that	the	government’s	position	on	this	matter	may	reflect	
a	dominant	doctrine	 in	Turkish	 Islam,	which	states	 that	 the	Alevi	beliefs	
are	not	a	religion	but	heresy.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	this	par-
ticular	case,	the	AKP	is	more	guilty	of	failing	to	improve	the	situation	of	the	
Alevi	minority	rather	than	of	introducing	new,	discriminatory	regulations,	
because	the	current	legal	status	of	Alevism	was	established	before	the	AKP	
came	to	power.
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the	European	Union.	In	its	implementation	of	the	EU	acquis,	the	
AKP	government	has	gone	much	 further	 than	would	have	been	
necessary	simply	 to	conceal	 its	alleged	 ‘Islamic	agenda.’	 If	 there	
was	 a	 chance,	 the	AKP	 government	would	most	 likely	 agree	 to	
Turkey’s	EU	accession,	in	the	belief	that	this	would	facilitate	the	
political,	social	and	economic	modernisation	of	the	country	and	
build	bridges	between	the	West	and	the	Islamic	world.	EU	mem-
bership	could	also	be	reconciled	with	the	traditional	values	held	
by	Turkish	society;	and	by	strengthening	democratic	principles	
in	the	country,	the	AKP	could	increase	the	power	of	the	conserva-
tive	majority	(i.e.	its	traditional	electorate).	It	appears	that	a	state	
model	 approximating	 –	 albeit	 not	 identical	with	 –	Western	 de-
mocracies,	which	 guarantees	 religious	 freedom	 but	 keeps	 state	
and	religion	separate,	is	seen	by	the	AKP	as	optimal	for	increasing	
the	efficiency	of	the	country	and	its	economy,	as	well	as	being	able	
to	retain	the	Islamic	values	of	the	Turkish	people.8
Ironically,	the	element	of	AKP’s	identity	which	plays	a	more	im-
portant	role	in	shaping	its	domestic	policies	than	Islamic	tradi-
tion	is	its	Kemalist-republican	heritage.	This	particular	tradition	
assigns	the	state	a	vital	role	in	the	political,	social	and	economic	
spheres,	 and	 gives	 it	 a	 dominant	 influence	 over	 social	 values	
and	 faith	matters.	 It	 allows	 restrictions	 on	 freedom	 of	 speech	
if	the	national	interest	should	require	it,	and	promotes	Turkish	
nationalism	and	strict	control	over	religious	practices.	Accord-
ing	to	this	tradition,	in	public	life,	the	authority	of	the	country’s	
leader	or	the	party	head,	is	highly	valued.	With	the	exception	of	
direct	 elections,	 the	 general	public	 are	passive	 subjects	 rather	
8	 When	 asked	why	 he	 decided	 to	 send	 his	 daughter	 to	 study	 in	 the	 United	
States,	Prime	Minister	Erdoğan	cited	America’s	religious	freedom	as	the	rea-
son.	Although	various	members	of	the	Turkish	government	have	repeatedly	
called	for	the	separation	of	state	and	religion,	the	AKP	has	so	far	refused	to	
close	down	the	Directorate	of	Religious	Affairs	(inherited	from	Turkey’s	Ke-
malist	era),	which	embodies	the	state’s	control	over	religious	practices	in	the	
country.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	a	situation	where	the	AKP	
would	accept	an	inverse	relationship	between	religion	and	state,	 in	which	
religious	leaders	would	have	formal	authority	over	political	life.
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than	active	actors	in	the	political	life	of	their	country.	Before	the	
AKP	 took	 power,	 the	 integral	 components	 of	 the	 Kemalist-re-
publican	tradition	in	Turkey	included	the	cult	of	Mustafa	Kemal	
Atatürk,	the	dominant	role	of	the	army	in	political	life,	and	the	
strongly	emphasised	secularism	of	the	state.	Regarding	foreign	
policy,	 it	 called	 for	 the	 severing	 of	 ties	with	 the	 Islamic	world	
and	integration	with	the	West,	which	however	had	been	regard-
ed	with	suspicion.
Since	coming	to	power,	the	AKP’s	main	political	goal	has	been	to	
dismantle	the	political	system	based	on	republican	and	Kemalist	
values.	The	party	has	been	largely	successful	in	achieving	these	
goals	in	relation	to	rooting	out	the	cult	of	Atatürk,	reducing	the	
role	of	the	army,	ending	the	public	marginalisation	of	Islam	and	
putting	an	end	to	its	isolation	from	the	Muslim	world.	However,	
other	aspects	of	this	legacy,	such	as	elements	of	authoritarianism,	
statism	and	nationalism,	 are	 clearly	visible	 in	 the	AKP	govern-
ment’s	policies.
It	appears,	then,	that	the	AKP’s	worldview	incorporates	both	Eu-
ropean	values,	such	as	democracy,	human	rights	and	the	market	
economy,	as	well	as	Muslim	values,	and	–	consciously	or	not	–	the	
Kemalist-republican	legacy.	These	three	components	of	the	AKP’s	
worldview	vary	in	how	they	perceive	the	importance	of	European	
normes,	as	well	as	in	terms	of	practical	solutions	for	constructing	
a	new	social	and	political	order	 in	Turkey.	Taken	together,	 they	
add	up	to	a	rather	discordant	image	of	Europe.	
It	seems,	however,	that	in	the	AKP’s	worldview	the	role	of	Islamic	
tradition	in	political	and	economic	life	should	be	limited.	So	far,	
it	has	focused	on	increasing	the	religious	rights	of	the	local	Sun-
ni	Muslims	and	on	maintaining	the	status	of	Sunni	Islam	above	
other	belief	systems	and	religions	in	the	state’s	legal	system.	With	
minor	 exceptions,	 the	 government	 has	 refrained	 from	 impos-
ing	Islamic	norms	on	society	as	a	whole.	This	part	of	its	heritage	
has	played	a	certain	role	in	guiding	Ankara’s	policy	towards	the	
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Middle	East.	But	overall	the	AKP’s	Islamic	roots	have	had	little	im-
pact	on	the	party’s	policy	towards	the	EU.
It	 seems	 that	 the	architecture	of	Turkey’s	 socio-political	 system	
has	been	far	more	influenced	by	the	competing	European	and	Ke-
malist-republican	traditions.	Although	the	latter	does	not	oppose	
Turkey’s	integration	with	the	EU,	in	practice,	however,	it	does	dis-
tance	Turkey	from	Europe	because	of	the	way	in	which	this	tradi-
tion	has	been	shaping	the	country’s	domestic	policy,	e.g.	by	legiti-
mising	authoritarianism	and	statism.
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ii. the instrumentAlism of AnKArA’s 
relAtions with the eu
Although	the	AKP’s	worldview	orientation	plays	a	significant	role	
in	shaping	its	policies,	the	party’s	political	calculations	aimed	at	
consolidating	power	appear	even	more	important.	These	calcula-
tions	are	conditioned	primarily	by	the	current	situation	in	domes-
tic	politics,	 in	 the	 economy	and	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	The	
Turkish	government	 is	well	aware	 that	 the	chances	of	breaking	
the	current	stalemate	in	the	accession	negotiations	are	minimal.	
After	all,	individual	EU	members	remain	opposed	to	Ankara’s	EU	
ambitions,	and	real	progress	on	the	Cyprus	issue	seems	unlikely.	
However,	although	the	prospect	of	imminent	EU	membership	is	
currently	absent,	the	negotiations	themselves	are	not	completely	
pointless.	For	now	at	least,	the	real	objective	of	the	talks	is	not	to	
finalise	them,	but	to	keep	the	very	process	of	negotiations	alive.	
The	process	itself	is	being	used	by	the	Turkish	government	for	po-
litical	ends.	It	is	likely	that	the	future	position	of	Prime	Minister	
Erdoğan’s	government	with	regard	to	Turkey’s	accession	negotia-
tions	will	depend	less	on	its	ideological	preferences	or	the	likeli-
hood	of	quick	accession	to	the	EU,	and	more	on	the	role	the	pro-
cess	will	play	for	the	AKP’s	position	on	Turkey’s	domestic	political	
scene,	 the	country’s	economic	situation,	and	for	 its	place	on	the	
international	stage.
1. Europe as an instrument of political struggle
Since	 taking	 power,	 the	 AKP	 government	 has	 taken	 advantage	
of	EU	support	to	both	implement	reforms	dismantling	the	exist-
ing	architecture	of	the	Turkish	state	and	to	stave	off	attacks	from	
its	political	rivals.	From	the	very	beginning,	Erdoğan’s	party	has	
been	suspected	by	the	opposition,	the	army,	and	by	large	segments	
of	public	opinion	of	seeking	to	replace	the	Kemalist	system	with	
a	system	based	on	Islam,	and	of	intending	to	reorient	Turkey’s	for-
eign	policy	away	from	the	West	and	towards	the	Muslim	world.	
The	AKP	hoped	that	by	supporting	Turkey’s	integration	with	the	
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European	Union	and	by	launching	reforms	aimed	at	aligning	Tur-
key	with	the	European	model,	it	would	be	able	to	refute	these	al-
legations.	The	EU’s	favourable	reaction	to	Ankara’s	pro-European	
orientation	 increased	 the	 AKP’s	 credibility	 among	 the	 Turkish	
people.	Over	subsequent	years,	the	acceptance	the	AKP	received	
from	European	states	and	from	the	EU	has	played	an	important	
part	in	legitimising	the	party	on	the	Turkish	political	scene,	and	
in	consolidating	and	expanding	its	electorate.
Domestically,	the	AKP’s	pro-EU	policy	has	been	most	effective	in	
reducing	the	role	of	the	army	in	Turkish	politics.	Europe’s	support	
for	Ankara	has	 lowered	the	risk	of	another	military	coup,	since	
the	army	realised	that	such	a	move	would	result	in	the	country’s	
isolation	on	the	international	stage.	Similarly,	due	to	high	levels	
of	public	support	for	Turkey’s	EU	membership	in	the	first	half	of	
the	previous	decade,	any	attempts	to	remove	the	AKP	from	pow-
er	would	have	met	with	considerable	public	resistance,	not	only	
from	the	AKP’s	electorate	but	also	from	the	liberals	and	the	left,	
who	see	EU	accession	as	a	priority.	Europe’s	support	proved	cru-
cial	during	successive	battles	fought	by	the	Erdoğan	camp	against	
the	 army	 and	 the	 Kemalist	 establishment	 for	 primacy	 on	 Tur-
key’s	political	scene:	first,	when	it	tried	to	reduce	the	role	of	the	
army-dominated	National	Security	Council9,	then	when	it	sought	
Abdullah	Gül’s	presidential	nomination	in	200710,	when	the	Con-
stitutional	Court	tried	to	ban	the	party	in	200811,	as	well	as	when	
9	 The	 National	 Security	 Council	 was	 a	 constitutional	 body	 controlled	 and	
dominated	by	the	army,	which	held	formal	and	effective	powers	to	override	
the	decisions	of	the	state’s	civil	institutions.	The	NSC	guaranteed	the	prima-
cy	of	the	military	in	the	country’s	political	life.	Its	powers	were	drastically	
reduced	by	 the	AKP	through	a	series	of	 reforms	preparing	Turkey	 for	EU	
membership,	including	a	2011	referendum	on	constitutional	amendments.
10	 For	five	months	in	2007,	the	Kemalist	establishment,	particularly	the	army,	
blocked	Abdullah	Gül’s	presidential	nomination	(at	the	time,	Turkish	presi-
dents	were	elected	by	parliament).	The	opposition	to	his	nomination	reflect-
ed	a	real	fear	that	his	election	would	threatens	the	secular	character	of	the	
state.	The	standoff	led	to	a	serious	political	crisis	in	the	country.
11	 In	2008,	the	prosecutor’s	office	filed	a	motion	with	the	Constitutional	Court	
to	close	down	the	AKP	and	implement	a	5-year	ban	on	holding	public	office	
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the	AKP	thwarted	the	Ergenekon	group’s	alleged	attempt	to	stage	
a	coup d’état12,	and	finally,	during	the	introduction	of	amendments	
to	the	constitution	in	2011.
The	AKP’s	 objective	 of	 aligning	 Turkey	with	 EU	 standards	was	
helpful	not	only	in	its	struggle	to	curb	army	influence,	but	also	in	
implementing	reforms	which	otherwise	would	have	encountered	
strong	opposition	from	interest	groups	and	from	the	public.	One	
example	of	 this	was	 the	 reform	of	 the	 judiciary,	which	allowed	
the	AKP	to	remove	the	party’s	most	ardent	opponents	from	some	
of	the	most	senior	positions	in	the	country’s	courts,	the	Constitu-
tional	Court,	and	the	prosecutor’s	office.	By	citing	political	pres-
sure	from	Brussels,	the	government	was	able	to	carry	out	reforms	
which	increased	the	rights	of	religious	and	ethnic	minorities	(es-
pecially	the	Kurds,	whose	votes	the	AKP	was	trying	to	win).	Im-
portantly,	the	need	to	comply	with	EU	standards	made	it	possible	
for	the	government	to	lift	a	ban	on	women’s	headscarves	in	public	
institutions.	More	recently,	the	AKP	cited	the	example	of	the	Nor-
dic	countries	and	imposed	restrictions	on	the	sale	of	alcohol.13
Furthermore,	EU	candidate	status	increases	Turkey’s	bargaining	
power	in	negotiations	on	a	series	of	important	issues,	such	as	the	
abolition	of	Schengen	visas,	better	conditions	for	Turkish	compa-
nies	operating	 in	 the	EU,	 and	 the	 inclusion	of	Turkish	 students	
in	EU	scholarship	programmes,	amongst	others.	Brussels’	finan-
cial	support	for	the	implementation	of	the	acquis communautaire	
in	Turkey	 is	another	 significant	 incentive.	Turkey	 is	 the	 largest	
for	71	AKP	members,	including	the	prime	minister	and	the	president.	The	
motion	was	ultimately	rejected	(by	just	one	vote).	This	was	the	second	mo-
tion	 to	 close	 the	AKP	down,	 following	 a	 similar	 attempt	 in	 2002.	 In	both	
cases,	the	EU	urged	the	court	not	to	close	the	party	down.
12	 Ergenekon	is	an	alleged	secret	organisation	set	up	by	high-ranking	army	of-
ficers,	politicians	and	members	of	academia	and	the	media,	which	attempt-
ed	to	destabilise	the	country	and	pave	the	way	for	a	military	coup	after	the	
AKP	took	power	in	2002.
13	 In	fact,	alcoholism	rates	in	Turkey	are	much	lower	than	in	the	Nordic	countries.
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beneficiary	of	EU	funds	among	the	EU	candidate	countries	(An-
kara	is	to	receive	nearly	€1	billion	in	2013	alone).
However,	it	appears	that	domestically	the	significance	of	EU	inte-
gration	as	a	political	instrument	has	been	waning	since	the	end	
of	the	last	decade.	This	has	been	caused	by	a	number	of	factors.	
The	blocking	of	the	integration	process	by	Cyprus	and	a	drop	in	
support	for	Turkey’s	membership	inside	the	European	Union	have	
weakened	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 AKP’s	 claims	 that	 its	 political	
decisions	must	continue	to	reflect	 the	objective	of	EU	accession.	
Flagging	 support	 for	 integration	 with	 the	 EU	 among	 the	 Turk-
ish	public	has	had	a	similar	effect.	The	AKP’s	victory	in	its	power	
struggle	against	the	army	and	its	continued	lead	over	the	opposi-
tion	have	given	the	Turkish	government	more	leeway	in	domestic	
politics,	and	made	it	less	reliant	on	support	from	Europe.	Among	
the	manifestations	of	Europe’s	dwindling	significance	in	Turkish	
politics	has	been	the	AKP’s	decision	not	to	seek	the	EU’s	backing	
during	the	peace	talks	with	the	Kurds	which	the	government	re-
sumed	at	the	end	of	2012.	Other	manifestations	include	the	inten-
sification	of	authoritarianism	within	the	government	and	a	slow-
down	in	the	implementation	of	reforms	aligning	Turkey	with	EU	
standards,	which	has	exposed	Ankara	to	criticism	from	Brussels	
and	individual	EU	member	states.
Nonetheless,	claiming	that	the	EU	no	longer	matters	for	the	AKP’s	
position	on	the	Turkish	political	scene	would	be	an	exaggeration.	
This	 became	 apparent,	 for	 example,	 during	 the	 political	 crisis	
which	followed	a	brutal	police	crackdown	on	a	series	of	protests	in	
the	country	in	June	2013.14	The	EU	condemned	the	AKP’s	response	
to	the	protests	and	threatened	to	change	its	earlier	decision	to	re-
sume	accession	 talks	with	Turkey.	This	 raised	 serious	 concerns	
among	Erdoğan’s	ministers	about	the	public	reaction	to	a	possible	
14	 In	May	and	June	2013,	Turkey	saw	a	series	of	large-scale	protests	against	the	
authoritarianism	 of	 the	AKP	 government.	 The	 protests	 started	when	 the	
police	violently	broke	up	a	demonstration	against	the	closure	of	Istanbul’s	
Gezi	Park.
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crisis	between	Ankara	and	Brussels.	Eventually,	as	a	result	of	An-
kara’s	diplomatic	efforts,	the	negotiations	were	formally	resumed	
(although	in	fact	the	talks	were	postponed	until	a	later	date).15	The	
protests	and	their	aftermath	have	shown	that	a	significant	part	of	
the	population	is	strongly	opposed	to	any	attempts	by	the	govern-
ment	 to	abandon	democratic	 standards,	and	 that	Europe	 is	 still	
able	to	seriously	threaten	the	position	of	the	AKP	by	undermining	
its	credibility	as	a	democratic	force.
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Turkish	government,	therefore,	at	
present	the	EU’s	support	is	desirable	but	not	necessary	to	achieve	
its	 domestic	 policy	 objectives.	 In	 those	 instances	 where	 short-
term	political	 interests	appear	to	be	more	important,	Erdoğan’s	
government	 is	 increasingly	willing	 to	 act	 on	 them,	 even	at	 the	
risk	of	opening	itself	up	to	criticism	from	Brussels.	Nonetheless,	
AKP	politicians	realise	that	although	the	benefits	of	the	current	
EU	 integration	policy	 are	 limited,	 abandoning	 the	negotiations	
could	prove	very	costly	indeed,	offering	little	in	return.	This	will	
likely	encourage	the	AKP	to	continue	the	process	of	integration	
with	the	EU.
2. Economic cooperation with the EU as a source  
of economic growth
The	Turkish	economy	 is	heavily	dependent	on	cooperation	with	
the	European	Union,	while	the	conditions	and	extent	of	this	coop-
eration	is	closely	linked	to	the	status	of	Turkey’s	accession	talks.	
Therefore,	political	relations	with	Brussels	are	important	for	the	
AKP	as	an	instrument	of	economic	policy.
Under	 the	 AKP	 government,	 the	 economic	 ties	 between	 Tur-
key	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 have	 strengthened	 significantly,	
15	 Szymon	Ananicz	and	Kamil	Frymark,	EU-Turkey:	A	new	negotiation	chap-
ter	will	open	conditionally,	Eastweek,	OSW,	26	June	2013,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-06-26/euturkey-a-new-negotiation-
chapter-will-open-conditionally
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as	evidenced	by	the	almost	threefold	increase	in	bilateral	trade.	
The	EU	remains	a	major	market	for	Turkish	exporters.	Although	
Turkey’s	exports	to	the	EU	have	declined	in	recent	years	in	per-
centage	 terms,	 their	 volume	has	nearly	 tripled	 from	 $20	billion	
in	2002	to	almost	$60	billion	in	2012	in	absolute	terms.16	It	is	im-
portant	to	note	that	Europe	is	currently	the	main,	and	almost	the	
only	 export	 market	 for	 Turkish	 medium-	 and	 high-technology	
products.	These	goods	account	for	nearly	40%	of	Turkish	exports	
to	the	EU,	and	their	sale	has	a	much	greater	impact	on	the	state	of	
the	Turkish	economy	than	the	exports	of	low-tech	products	that	
dominate	Turkey’s	trade	with	other	countries.17	This	is	an	impor-
tant	 factor	 stimulating	 innovation	 and	 enhancing	 the	 competi-
tiveness	of	the	Turkish	economy,	especially	since	the	global	trade	
in	low-tech	products	has	become	highly	competitive.18
The	 importance	of	 the	European	Union	as	a	 trading	partner	 for	
Ankara	has	been	stressed	in	government	forecasts,	which	suggest	
that	the	EU	will	remain	the	most	significant	market	for	Turkish	
exports	for	at	least	another	decade.19	This	opinion	is	shared	by	the	
influential	Turkish	Exporters	Assembly	(TIM).20	This	explains	the	
government’s	determination	to	participate	in	the	negotiations	on	
the	 proposed	 EU-US	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Part-
nership	(TTIP).	Ankara	has	expressed	a	strong	interest	in	joining	
16	 http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=7145D543-D8D3-8566-4520-
DF	B6	CC4A86BA
17	 Daniel	Gros	and	Can	Selçuki.	The	Changing	Structure	of	Turkey’s	Trade	and	
Industrial	Competitiveness:	 Implications	for	the	EU,	CEPS	Working	Paper	
03,	2013,	http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_WP_03.pdf
18	 Ibid.
19	 Küresel	 Ticarette	 Türkiye’nin	 Yeniden	 Konumlandırılması	 Dis	 Ticarette	
yeni	rotarlar,	2011,	Ministry	of	the	Economy	of	the	Republic	of	Turkey,	pp.	
27–28.	http://ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/98C9FBB8-D8D3-8566-45209FC758B-
662CB/dtyr.pdf
20	 TIM	is	an	association	of	Turkish	exporters.	 It	has	an	 important	 influence	
on	the	Turkish	government’s	export	policy.	TIM	played	an	important	role	
in	the	development	of	the	government’s	export	strategy	until	2023.	http://
www.tim.org.tr/files/downloads/2023/tim%202023%20ihracat%20strate-
jisi%20raporu.pdf,	p.	327.
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the	TTIP.	A	recent	statement	by	Turkey’s	Deputy	Prime	Minister	
Ali	Babacan	has	suggested	that	remaining	outside	the	TIPP	could	
cost	his	country	$20	billion	a	year,	and	was	a	clear	indication	that	
Ankara	sees	this	possibility	as	a	serious	threat.21
For	a	number	of	years,	 the	 share	of	EU	capital	 in	 foreign	direct	
investment	 in	 Turkey	 has	 remained	 above	 70%.22	 A	 substantial	
part	of	the	investment	is	allocated	to	the	construction	of	modern	
manufacturing	plants	and	service	providers,	and	is	seen	as	an	im-
portant	source	of	Turkey’s	technological	modernisation.	Accord-
ing	to	the	Turkish	Ministry	for	European	Integration,	as	much	as	
85%	of	the	capital	invested	in	the	country	in	advanced	technolo-
gies	comes	from	the	European	Union.23
Turkey	 is	 closely	 linked	 with	 the	 European	 economic	 system	
through	a	number	of	 institutions.	Formally,	 the	main	structure	
linking	 the	 two	 economies	 is	 the	 EU-Turkey	 Customs	 Union,	
which	covers	trade	in	industrial	products.	It	gives	Turkey	access	
to	one	of	the	largest	markets	for	industrial	goods,	where	it	is	pro-
tected	from	external	competition	 in	 the	same	way	as	EU	opera-
tors	are.	The	Turkish	government’s	fiscal	policy	is	guided	by	the	
EU’s	Maastricht	criteria,	which	demonstrates	Ankara’s	intention	
to	 continue	 its	 affiliation	 with	 the	 European	 economic	 system.	
The	criteria	have	been	developed	for	countries	applying	for	euro	
zone	membership,	which	means	that	Turkey	does	not	have	to	fol-
low	them.	It	continues	to	do	so,	however,	because	it	is	convinced	
that	adhering	to	the	criteria	facilitates	the	stability	and	growth	
of	the	Turkish	economy,	which	in	turn	increases	the	country’s	at-
tractiveness	to	European	investors.	The	importance	of	economic	
21	 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-310557-turkey-may-seek-revisions-
to-customs-union-over-eu-us-deal.html
22	 See	http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/pa-
ges	/FDIinTurkey.aspx
23	 Ministry	for	EU	Affairs,	Progress	Report	prepared	by	Turkey,	2012,	http://
www.abgs.gov.tr/files/IlerlemeRaporlari/2012/2012_tr_progress_report_
en.pdf
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
13
25
cooperation	with	Europe	is	also	visible	in	the	AKP’s	fairly	consist-
ent	 implementation	of	 the	sections	of	 the	acquis relating	 to	eco-
nomic	matters	–	even	though	it	often	neglects	other	areas	of	the	
legislation.24
Over	the	past	few	years	Turkey	has	sought	to	reduce	its	economic	
dependence	on	 the	West	 and	has	 tried	 to	 acquire	 a	more	active	
role	in	its	economic	relations	with	the	EU.	With	that	objective	in	
mind,	Ankara	has	taken	measures	to	increase	its	trade	volumes	
with	other	regions.	Consequently,	between	2002	and	2012,	Turk-
ish	exports	to	the	EU	fell	from	56%	to	38%,	while	Turkish	exports	
to	 the	Middle	East	rose	 from	9%	to	27%.25	Moreover,	 in	2012	 the	
government	increased	opportunities	for	Islamic	banking	(which	
entered	the	market	in	1983),	which	could	indicate	Ankara’s	desire	
to	diversify	its	sources	of	capital	and	an	attempt	to	reduce	its	reli-
ance	on	Europe	in	this	area.
Erdoğan’s	government	has	also	been	seeking	to	strengthen	its	po-
sition	 in	economic	 relations	with	 the	EU,	as	evidence	by	a	 shift	
in	Turkey’s	energy	policy.	By	withdrawing	(together	with	Azer-
baijan)	from	the	Nabucco	project	proposed	by	the	EU,	Turkey	has	
effectively	 ‘hijacked’	 the	EU’s	concept	of	an	alternative	gas	sup-
ply	 route,	 known	 as	 the	 Southern	 Corridor.	 Ankara	 hopes	 that	
the	proposed	gas	pipeline	(TANAP)	will	allow	it	to	further	its	own	
geopolitical	agenda,	rather	than	letting	it	serve	the	energy	inter-
ests	of	the	European	Union,	as	Brussels	had	envisaged.26	A	further	
symptom	of	Ankara’s	growing	assertiveness	in	its	relations	with	
24	 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/
25	 These	changes	were	largely	the	result	of	the	financial	crisis	in	the	EU	and	
the	 temporary	 loss	of	European	markets;	partly,	however,	 they	were	also	
the	outcome	of	a	conscious	policy	to	promote	trade	relations	and	investment	
in	the	MENA	region.
26	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 Southern	 Gas	 Corridor	 managed	 by	 Azerbaijan	
and	Turkey,	OSW	Commentary,	 18/07/2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pu	-
blikacje/osw-commentary/2012-07-18/southern-gas-corridor-managed-
azerbaijan-and-turkey
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the	EU	has	been	the	Turkish	government’s	increasingly	frequent	
objections	to	how	the	Customs	Union	is	run.27
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Turkey’s	 trade	 relations	 with	
countries	across	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	depend	largely	
on	the	current	political	climate,	as	illustrated	by	a	surge	in	gold	
exports	to	Iran	in	2012,	which	translated	into	an	increase	of	about	
7%	 in	Turkish	exports	 to	 the	Middle	East	 that	year.28	Moreover,	
according	to	the	an	analysis	by	the	Turkish	Ministry	of	Economy,	
the	potential	for	exports	to	Ankara’s	key	trading	partners	in	the	
Middle	East	(especially	Iraq)	has	nearly	been	reached,	which	sug-
gests	 that	Turkey	 is	 expecting	 a	 slowdown	 in	 the	 rate	 at	which	
its	trade	with	the	region	could	grow	in	the	coming	years.29	In	ad-
dition,	 a	 significant	 deterioration	 of	 Turkey’s	 political	 relations	
with	most	Middle	Eastern	countries	between	2012	and	201330,	and	
27	 Ankara	has	been	increasingly	irritated	by	the	EU’s	tendency	to	ignore	Tur-
key’s	demands	in	the	negotiation	of	trade	agreements	with	third	countries.	
Under	the	EU-Turkey	Customs	Union	agreement,	Ankara	must	comply	with	
the	 provisions	 of	 any	 trade	 agreements	 concluded	 by	 the	 EU	 with	 third	
countries,	even	though	in	practice	the	government	in	Ankara	is	not	consult-
ed	during	the	negotiations.	Turkey	has	also	been	critical	of	the	continued	
exclusion	of	Turkish	nationals	from	the	EU	labour	market.	This,	according	
to	the	Turkish	government,	puts	Turkish	businesses	operating	in	the	EU	un-
der	the	Customs	Union	agreement	in	a	worse	position	than	their	European	
competitors.	Turkey	has	also	criticised	the	EU	for	imposing	visa	restrictions	
and	transport	quotas	on	Turkish	nationals,	and	for	launching	anti-dumping	
investigations	on	trumped-up	charges,	which	in	practice	harm	the	position	
of	Turkish	companies	operating	in	the	EU.	See	the	following	article,	which	
was	 published	 by	 a	 former	 Turkish	 Customs	 and	 Trade	Minister:	 http://
www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/2012-1-HayatiYazici.pdf
28	 The	unprecedented	volume	of	gold	exports	to	Iran	in	2012	was	in	fact	a	form	
of	payment	for	Iranian	crude	oil.	However,	since	the	bill	was	settled	with	
gold	 rather	 than	 in	 dollars	 (following	 the	 introduction	 of	 US	 sanctions	
against	Iran),	the	Turkish	trade	statistics	showed	the	transaction	under	‘ex-
ports’.	This	may	have	given	the	false	impression	of	a	rapid	reorientation	of	
Turkey’s	foreign	trade	from	the	West	to	the	East.
29	 See	 Türkiye’nin	 Yeniden	 Konumlandırılması,	 http://ekonomi.gov.tr/up-
load/	98	C9FBB8-D8D3-8566-45209FC758B662CB/dtyr.pdf
30	 This	 reflects	 the	 rapid	 deterioration	 in	 relations	 between	 Ankara	 and	
a	number	of	Arab	countries,	including	Saudi	Arabia,	Qatar,	and	the	United	
Arab	Emirates,	which	unlike	Turkey	refused	to	condemn	the	military	coup	
in	Egypt	in	July	2013.
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the	 growing	political	 instability	 in	 those	 countries	will	 further	
complicate	economic	relations	with	the	region.31
It	is	therefore	highly	likely	that	the	European	Union	will	remain	
Turkey’s	most	important	trading	partner,	and	at	least	in	the	im-
mediate	future,	no	other	region	will	be	able	to	replace	the	EU	as	
Ankara’s	main	foreign	investor	or	its	biggest	export	market.	The	
fact	that	the	government	is	well	aware	of	the	EU’s	importance	for	
Turkey	is	apparent	not	only	in	its	economic	analyses	and	political	
speeches,	but	also	in	the	measures	it	has	taken	to	further	increase	
Turkey’s	institutional	integration	with	the	European	market	and	
with	the	EU	economic	system.
Turkey’s	position	in	trade	with	the	European	Union	and	its	abil-
ity	to	attract	investment	from	the	EU	will,	to	a	large	extent,	de-
pend	on	the	quality	of	Ankara’s	political	relations	with	Brussels.32	
Turkey’s	 EU	 membership	 negotiations	 are	 regarded	 by	 foreign	
investors	as	a	guarantee	of	the	predictability	and	stability	of	 its	
economy.	Any	political	crisis	between	Ankara	and	Brussels	would	
inevitably	 reduce	 confidence	 levels	 among	 foreign	 companies	
interested	in	investing	in	Turkey,	which	would	lead	to	a	signifi-
cant	outflow	of	capital	from	the	Turkish	market.	Maintaining	the	
existing	institutional	channels	of	dialogue	between	Ankara	and	
Brussels,	as	well	as	sustaining	good	political	relations	with	the	EU	
and	its	member	states,	will	be	instrumental	for	Turkey	to	secure	
its	 national	 interests	 with	 regard	 to	 trade	 within	 the	 Customs	
31	 For	example,	after	Ankara	(unlike	most	Arab	states)	condemned	the	mili-
tary	coup	in	Egypt	in	July	2013,	the	United	Arab	Emirates	cancelled	its	$12	
billion	investment	in	a	Turkish	power	station.	In	addition,	the	new	govern-
ment	 in	Cairo	 introduced	restrictions	on	Turkish	companies	operating	 in	
Egypt,	 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uae-firm-may-exit-12-billion-
energy-project-in-turkey-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=53239
32	 According	 to	 the	Turkish	Ministry	 for	EU	Affairs,	 “the	 continuity	of	 eco-
nomic	benefit	is	ensured	by	Turkey’s	commitment	to	the	EU	process	as	a	can-
didate	country	and	the	environment	of	stability	and	opportunities	brought	
by	this	process”.	See	Progress	Report	prepared	by	Turkey,	2012.	http://www.
abgs.gov.tr/files/IlerlemeRaporlari/2012/2012_tr_progress_report_en.pdf
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Union	and	in	relation	to	the	emerging	TTIP.	Furthermore,	to	im-
prove	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Turkish	 businesses	 operating	 in	
the	European	market,	the	government	will,	for	example,	need	to	
campaign	for	the	abolition	of	Schengen	visas	for	Turkish	citizens,	
which	could	prove	difficult	if	Ankara	were	to	loosen	its	ties	with	
the	EU.	Therefore,	economic	cooperation	with	Europe	will	remain	
an	important	instrument	of	the	AKP	government’s	economic	pol-
icy,	and	it	will	play	a	significant	role	in	motivating	Ankara	not	to	
abandon	its	policy	of	integration	with	the	European	Union.
3. Europe as a partner on the international stage
The	European	Union	and	 its	member	states	are	useful	partners	
for	Ankara	on	 the	 international	 stage,	even	 though	Turkey	sees	
them	 as	 less	 significant	 than	 the	 United	 States.	 From	Ankara’s	
point	of	view,	cooperation	with	the	EU	is	important	because	of	the	
major	actors	in	the	region,	only	Europe	values	Turkey’s	stability	
and	welcomes	its	regional	ambitions.	Whereas	Ankara	sees	other	
actors	as	rivals	or	a	potential	threat	(Russia,	Iran,	Iraq,	Qatar,	Sau-
di	Arabia,	Syria),	Europe	appears	to	be	the	only	region	that	does	
not	pose	a	serious	threat	to	its	national	security.	The	EU	member	
states	 and	 Turkey	 have	 taken	 similar	 stances	 on	most	 interna-
tional	issues	regarding	the	Balkans,	the	Middle	East,	Russia	and	
the	Caucasus,	as	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	Turkey	has	so	far	ac-
cepted	most	positions	worked	out	 jointly	by	EU	members	under	
the	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy.33	Although	the	official	
convergence	of	positions	rarely	 translate	 into	concrete	coopera-
tion,	it	does	limit	the	scope	for	rivalry	and	conflict.
The	alliance	with	Europe	helps	in	other	ways,	too.	For	example,	
Berlin’s	 official	 support	 for	 Ankara’s	 policy	 towards	 Syria	 has	
33	 See	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 Strategy	 and	 Progress	 Report.	 In	 recent	
years,	Turkey	shared	up	to	50-60%	of	the	common	positions	negotiated	by	
the	EU	member	states	on	matters	of	foreign	policy	with	regard	to	the	ini-
tiatives	which	Ankara	has	been	invited	to	by	the	EU.	http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/
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increased	its	legitimacy,	and	also	partly	shielded	Turkey	against	
a	 likely	pressure	 from	Russia,	which	supports	President	Bashar	
al-Assad’s	regime.34	Turkey	has	also	repeatedly	received	political	
support	from	the	EU.35	The	bilateral	cooperation	between	Turkey	
and	European	states	on	the	Syrian	conflict,	and	the	actions	taken	
by	Brussels	have	shown	that	in	crisis	situations	alliance	with	Eu-
rope	widens	Ankara’s	room	for	manoeuvre	on	the	 international	
stage.	 It	 cannot	be	ruled	out	 that	 if	 the	US	were	 to	continue	re-
ducing	its	presence	in	the	Middle	East,	European	countries	would	
gradually	become	even	more	important	for	Turkey	on	regional	se-
curity	matters.
Ankara’s	cooperation	with	the	EU	and	its	member	states	has	been	
also	instrumental	in	boosting	Turkey’s	international	prestige.	Ne-
gotiations	for	EU	membership	serve	as	a	confirmation	of	the	coun-
try’s	progress	in	adopting	democratic	principles	and	of	its	signifi-
cant	economic	power.	Ankara’s	ties	with	Europe	are	an	advantage	
in	its	relations	with	the	Middle	East.	Opinion	polls	conducted	in	
the	region	show	that	close	ties	with	the	EU	have	a	positive	impact	
on	Turkey’s	image	across	the	Arab	world.36	Closer	integration	with	
the	EU	 is	also	 important	 for	Ankara’s	 relations	with	 the	United	
States,	which	Turkey	sees	as	one	of	its	main	partners	on	security	
34	 Germany	has	openly	supported	Turkey’s	policy	towards	Syria.	For	example,	
Berlin	backed	Ankara	during	its	short-term	diplomatic	crisis	with	Moscow	
in	October	2012,	after	Turkey	 forced	a	Russian	plane	 to	 land	on	suspicion	
that	it	was	carrying	weapons	for	the	Syrian	regime.	See	Szymon	Ananicz	
and	Witold	Rodkiewicz,	Turkish-Russian	tension	of	the	Syrian	crisis,	East-
week,	 OSW,	 17	 October	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2012-10-17/turkishrussian-tension-over-syrian-crisis
35	 EU	High	Representative	Catherine	Ashton	condemned	the	shelling	of	Turk-
ish	village	carried	out	from	Syrian	territory.	The	Council	of	Europe	also	con-
demned	Syria	for	shooting	down	a	Turkish	plane	in	June	2012.	http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132709.
pdf,	 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/25/eu-condemns-	 syr-
ia-turkish-jet
36	 Mensur	Akgün	and	Sabiha	Senyücel	Gündoğar,	The	Perception	of	Turkey	
in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 TESEV	 2011,	 p.	 22.	 http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/
Publication/8df416b2-6026-4af7-bbc9-ba90954e7b3b/Perception%20of%20
Turkey%202011_IIBASIM.pdf
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issues	in	the	Middle	East	and	the	Black	Sea	region.	Washington	
has	traditionally	favoured	Turkey’s	membership	of	the	EU	in	the	
belief	that	this	would	consolidate	Turkish	democracy	and	increase	
the	predictability	of	its	key	ally	in	that	part	of	the	world.
Nonetheless,	one	should	not	overestimate	the	significance	of	the	
cooperation	on	international	affairs	for	other	aspects	of	EU-Tur-
key	relations.	Turkey’s	cooperation	with	individual	EU	members	
in	addressing	the	Middle	East	crisis	did	not	stem	from,	and	had	
little	to	do,	with	the	accession	process	itself,	and	could	be	contin-
ued	even	if	accession	talks	break	off.	The	link	between	member-
ship	talks	and	diplomatic	cooperation	has	been	more	pronounced	
in	Ankara’s	cooperation	with	the	EU	as	an	organisation,	but	Brus-
sels’	influence	on	the	balance	of	power	in	the	region	remains	rath-
er	small,	which	the	Turkish	government	is	well	aware	of.
Ankara’s	increasingly	assertive	foreign	policy,	its	efforts	to	acquire	
a	more	prominent	role	on	the	international	stage	–	and	above	all,	
the	increasingly	frequent	divergence	of	opinions	between	Turkey	
and	 Europe	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 Iranian	 nuclear	 programme,	
Israel,	 Palestine	 (Hamas),	 NATO’s	 intervention	 in	 Libya	 (in	 the	
planning	phase37)	and	the	military	coup	in	Egypt	–	might	indicate	
that	 the	AKP	 is	paying	 less	and	 less	attention	 to	diplomatic	and	
security	cooperation	with	the	EU.	The	policy	of	integration	with	
the	EU	is	of	little	use	when	it	comes	to	shoring	up	Turkey’s	inter-
national	standing.	The	significance	of	this	policy	lies	mainly	in	its	
capacity	for	raising	Turkey’s	prestige	as	a	modern	and	democratic	
state.	Although	Ankara’s	cooperation	with	individual	EU	member	
states	and	Brussels	on	international	matters	has	usually	proved	
useful	in	times	of	crises,	it	has	not	been	dependent	on	Turkey’s	EU	
accession	process.	This	cooperation	could	therefore	be	continued	
within	the	framework	of	NATO	or	on	a	bilateral	basis,	even	if	the	
membership	negotiations	were	to	be	abandoned.
37	 Turkey	initially	opposed	the	2011	NATO	intervention	in	Libya.
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iii. the public perception of turKey’s 
integrAtion with the eu
The	AKP	has	abandoned	the	previous	governments’	monopoly	on	
formulating	foreign	policy	objectives,	and	instead	has	been	trying	
to	ensure	that	Turkey’s	diplomacy	reflects	public	expectations	to	
a	greater	extent.	Therefore,	foreign	policy	should	avoid	conflicts	
with	Turkish	public	opinion,	 and,	 if	possible,	 should	be	used	as	
a	vehicle	for	mobilising	the	electorate.	This	is	why	any	prediction	
of	Ankara’s	future	policy	towards	the	EU	must	take	the	way	Eu-
rope	is	perceived	by	the	Turkish	public	into	account.
Europe’s	image	among	the	Turkish	people	has	always	been	rath-
er	ambiguous.	On	 the	one	hand,	attitudes	 towards	Europe	have	
been	influenced	by	distrust	dating	back	at	 least	to	World	War	I,	
when	Western	powers	attempted	to	divide	Turkey	into	their	own	
spheres	of	influence.	This	feeling	(commonly	known	as	the	‘Sèvres	
syndrome’38)	 remains	 particularly	 strong	 because	 the	 victory	
against	the	European	invaders	subsequently	led	to	the	founding	
of	the	new	Turkish	Republic.	Over	the	years,	the	education	system	
and	official	propaganda	have	turned	the	memory	of	those	events	
into	an	 important	 component	of	Turkish	national	 identity.	Cur-
rently,	distrust	of	the	West	is	being	fuelled	by	certain	actions	of	
European	countries	that,	according	to	Turkish	public	opinion,	are	
aimed	at	weakening	Turkey:	for	example,	allowing	the	PKK	to	op-
erate	in	European	countries.	This	perception	is	also	strengthened	
by	Europe’s	continued	reluctance	to	allow	Turkey	into	the	EU.
On	the	other	hand,	Europe	is	seen	as	an	attractive	model	of	po-
litical,	 social	 and	 economic	 organisation.	 This	 view	 dates	 back	
to	nineteenth-century	Ottoman	Empire,	which	 after	 a	 series	 of	
defeats	on	the	international	stage	carried	out	a	series	of	reforms	
38	 In	1920,	the	Entente	Powers	forced	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	sign	a	peace	trea-
ty,	which	stripped	it	of	much	of	its	territory	and	aimed	to	turn	it	into	a	vassal	
state.
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modelled	 on	 European	 powers.	 Europe’s	 favourable	 image	 has	
also	been	 reinforced	by	Turkey’s	Cold	War	alliance	with	NATO.	
Moreover,	 the	 positive	 accounts	 of	 Europe	 produced	 by	 Turk-
ish	 emigrants;	 and	 the	 entertainment	 industry,	which	portrays	
Western	Europe	in	a	good	light,	have	also	contributed	to	the	posi-
tive	image	of	Europe	among	Turkish	society.	The	vision	of	an	eco-
nomically	developed	Europe	was	in	stark	contrast	to	Turkey’s	un-
derdeveloped	economy	and	anachronistic	political	system,	which	
was	widely	regarded	as	unfair	and	inefficient.
Consequently,	Europe’s	image	in	Turkish	society	changes	depend-
ing	 on	which	 component	 of	 this	 dichotomous	 vision	prevails	 at	
any	given	time.	Low	levels	of	knowledge	about	Europe	and	the	EU	
among	Turks	result	in	frequent	and	significant	shifts	in	attitude	
towards	the	European	Union	(a	study	by	Hakan	Yilmaz	at	the	Uni-
versity	of	the	Bosphorus	suggests	that	only	11%	of	Turks	have	vis-
ited	Europe).39	Over	the	past	decade,	Turks’	 image	of	the	EU	and	
of	the	Europeans	has	worsened	dramatically.	Whereas	65%	of	the	
population	had	a	positive	view	of	Europeans	in	2003,	this	figure	
had	dropped	to	just	48%	by	2012;	meanwhile,	the	number	of	peo-
ple	reporting	a	negative	view	of	Europeans	rose	during	the	same	
period	from	26%	to	42%.	Fewer	Turks	also	believe	that	Europeans	
respect	the	rights	of	others,	or	that	they	are	well	organised.	These	
opinion	polls	show	that	Europe	is	losing	its	image	as	an	economic	
and	political	model	that	Turkey	might	be	interested	in	adopting.	
At	the	same	time,	there	has	been	a	growing	sense	of	distance	be-
tween	Turkey	and	Europe.	Between	2003	and	2012,	fewer	people	
felt	 that	 Turkey	 and	 Europe	were	 part	 of	 the	 same	 community	
geographically	(from	70%	to	46%),	historically	(from	61%	to	33%)	
and	culturally	(from	28%	to	21%).	However,	a	sense	of	being	part	of	
the	same	economic	community	increased	in	the	same	period	from	
39	 Hakan	Yılmaz	(ed.),	Türkiye’de	Avrupa	–	Şüpheciliği	Karşilaştirmali	Bul-
gular,	2003-2012,	http://hakanYılmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/
OSI-2012-Euroskep-2003-2012-Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf
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28%	to	37%.40	The	 increasingly	poor	 image	of	Europe	 in	Turkish	
society	has	led	to	a	drop	in	support	for	EU	membership.	Whereas	
in	2004	almost	74%	of	the	Turkish	people	were	in	favour	of	EU	ac-
cession,	currently	the	figure	stands	at	just	44%.41
1. The cause of Europe’s image problem
Europe’s	image	in	Turkey	has	suffered	for	a	number	of	reasons.	
First,	the	EU’s	policy	towards	Turkey	is	seen	as	unfair	and	hu-
miliating.	The	public	perception	is	that	the	EU	has	failed	to	de-
liver	on	its	earlier	promises	by	not	only	refusing	to	allow	Turkey	
into	the	European	Union,	but	also	by	maintaining	an	embargo	on	
trade	with	Northern	Cyprus	and	by	rejecting	calls	for	the	aboli-
tion	of	Schengen	visas	for	Turkish	citizens.42	Europe’s	image	has	
also	suffered	as	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis,	which	has	raised	
questions	about	the	effectiveness	of	the	European	economic	and	
political	 model.	 The	 image	 of	 Europe	 in	 crisis	 contrasts	 with	
the	rapid	economic	growth	witnessed	in	Turkey,	and	promotes	
the	belief	that	Turkey	does	not	need	integration	with	Europe	to	
achieve	 development	 and	modernisation.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	
a	widespread	view	in	Turkey	that	Europeans	have	a	hostile	at-
titude	towards	Islam,	which	is	perpetuated	by	(very	meticulous,	
although	at	 times	exaggerated)	Turkish	media	reports	of	 cases	
of	 intolerance	 against	Muslim	 immigrants	 in	 the	 EU	 (in	 2012,	
65%	of	respondents	believed	that	Europeans	were	xenophobic).43	
As	a	result,	there	is	a	growing	perception	in	Turkish	society	of	
a	 division	 between	 the	 Islamic	 world	 and	 the	 West,	 which	 is	
40	 Ibid.
41	 See	http://trends.gmfus.org/
42	 See	 Szymon	Ananicz,	 Cyprus	 presidency	 and	Turkey’s	 relations	with	 the	
European	 Union,	 OSW	 Commentary,	 26	 June	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-06-26/cyprus-presidency-and-
turkeys-relations-european-union
43	 Hakan	Yılmaz,	Türkiye’de	Avrupa	–	Şüpheciliği	Karşilaştirmali	Bulgular,	
2003-	2012,	http://hakanYılmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-
2012-	Euro	skep-2003-2012-Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf
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particularly	significant	for	a	society	that	attaches	great	impor-
tance	to	religion.	It	also	seems	that	the	currently	low	opinion	of	
the	European	Union	among	Turks	is	partly	a	result	of	the	nega-
tive	rhetoric	of	the	Turkish	government,	who	have	been	increas-
ingly	portraying	the	EU	in	a	bad	light	to	abdicate	themselves	of	
any	responsibility	for	the	lack	of	progress	in	the	accession	nego-
tiations.	Poor	knowledge	of	Europe,	combined	with	high	levels	of	
public	confidence	in	the	government,	means	that	negative	opin-
ions	expressed	publicly	for	political	reasons	tend	to	seep	into	the	
consciousness	of	a	significant	part	of	the	population.
The	relatively	negative	perception	of	Europe	in	Turkey	is	not	a	new	
phenomenon.	In	the	late	1990s,	anti-European	sentiment	was	also	
quite	strong,	after	which	Europe’s	image	improved	rapidly	in	the	
first	half	of	the	last	decade,	only	to	suffer	another	setback	in	re-
cent	 years.44	 This	 suggests	 that	Turkish	 attitudes	 to	Europe	 are	
easily	 influenced	by	 the	 immediate	 political	 and	 economic	 con-
text.	Nonetheless,	 it	appears	that	the	factors	responsible	for	the	
negative	vision	of	Europe	in	recent	years	could	be	relatively	du-
rable.	After	all,	there	are	currently	no	prospects	for	any	real	pro-
gress	in	Turkey’s	EU	accession	negotiations,	or	for	a	resolution	of	
the	Cyprus	conflict,	the	rehabilitation	of	the	image	of	Europeans	
as	tolerant	people,	or	for	a	quick	end	to	the	financial	crisis.	This	
raises	concerns	that	the	negative	image	of	Europe	could	take	deep	
root	in	Turkish	public	opinion.
44	 For	example,	in	1995	only	56%	of	Turks	were	in	favour	of	EU	membership	–	
that	is,	the	figure	was	almost	20	percentage	points	lower	than	a	decade	later.	
Ali	Çarkoğlu,	‘Who	wants	full	EU	membership?’	in	A.	Çarkoğlu,	B.	Rubbin	
(eds.),	Turkey	and	the	European	Union:	domestic	politics,	economic	integra-
tion	and	international	dynamics,	Cass,	London,	2004,	p.	173.
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2. A rise in conservatism as a factor distancing Turkey 
from Europe?
While	it	seems	that	the	above-mentioned	factors	have	indeed	had	
a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 poor	 image	 of	 Europe	 in	 Turkey	 in	
recent	years,	it	would	be	much	harder	to	defend	the	widespread	
opinion	that	the	shift	 in	public	perception	of	the	West	has	been	
caused	 by	 Turkey’s	 escalating	 conservatism.	 First,	 it	 would	 be	
difficult	to	find	evidence	for	the	alleged	rise	in	conservatism.	Al-
though	increasing	numbers	of	Turks	have	declared	an	adherence	
to	Islam,	an	opinion	poll	carried	out	by	the	University	of	the	Bos-
phorus	suggests	that	the	percentage	of	people	holding	conserva-
tive	views	on	moral	and	political	issues	decreased	slightly	between	
2006	and	2012.45	The	survey	also	points	to	a	small	drop	in	religious	
practice	 in	 Turkish	 society.	 These	 conclusions	 seem	 to	 confirm	
the	findings	of	other	studies:	a	TESEV	survey	suggests	that	most	
Turks	regard	their	parents’	generation	as	more	religious46,	while	
a	Bahçeşehir	University	opinion	poll	indicates	that	declarations	of	
adherence	to	Islam	increase	with	the	age	of	the	respondent.47	This	
challenges	the	argument	that	Turks	are	becoming	more	conserva-
tive,	especially	as	far	as	the	younger	generations	are	concerned.	
The	 studies	 also	 suggest	 that	Turkish	 society	 is	 becoming	more	
tolerant,	 and	 increasingly	 committed	 to	 political	 and	 religious	
pluralism,	as	well	 as	 to	other	values	 commonly	associated	with	
Europe	–	although	it	should	be	noted	that	over	the	past	six	years,	
these	changes	have	been	rather	small.
45	 Hakan	Yılmaz,	Turkiye’de	Muhafazakarlik:	Aile,	Cinsellik,	Din,	Bosphorus	
University,	Open	Society	Institute,	2012,	http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.
tr/pdf/muhafazakarlik/04.pdf
46	 Ali	Çarkoğlu,	Binnaz	Toprak,	Değişen	Türkiye’de	Din,	Toplum	Ve	Siyaset,	
TESEV	 2006,	 p.	 40,	 http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/a0c7	d243	-	
-50ec-48	77-9791-57d4b5bfd356/Degisen%20Turkiyede%20Din%20Top	lum	-	
	%20Siyaset%2011_2006.pdf
47	 Yılmaz	 Esmer	 (ed.),	 Türkiye	 Değerler	 Atlasi	 2012,	 Bahçeşehir	 University,	
2012,	 http://www.bahcesehir.edu.tr/haber/turkiye_degerler_atlasi_2012_
ya	y	inlandi.
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Under	the	AKP,	there	has	been	a	rapid	socio-economic	advance-
ment	 of	 the	poorer	 and	more	 conservative	 segments	 of	Turkish	
society.	In	the	last	decade,	many	members	of	this	group	migrated	
from	the	provinces	to	the	cities	and	took	prominent	positions	in	
public	administration,	the	media	and	business,	thus	creating	the	
impression	of	 the	 spread	of	 conservatism	and	 Islamic	values	 in	
society.	The	greater	visibility	of	Islam	in	public	has	also	been	af-
fected	by	the	partial	lifting	of	a	ban	on	women’s	headscarves	and	
the	removal	of	other	restrictions	that	previously	limited	the	free-
dom	of	religious	practice	and	public	demonstration	of	adherence	
to	Islam	(for	example,	fewer	restrictions	on	the	running	of	madra-
sas).	However,	the	studies	cited	earlier	suggest	that	more	frequent	
displays	of	conservative	attitudes	and	religious	faith	in	public	(for	
example,	through	dress)	do	not	mean	that	the	conservative	seg-
ments	of	the	population	have	increased	in	number.48
Secondly,	the	available	opinion	polls	call	into	question	the	idea	that	
conservatism	is	a	factor	distancing	Ankara	from	Europe.	Tradi-
tionally,	Turkey’s	integration	with	Europe	has	been	supported	by	
liberal	and	left-wing	academics,	media	professionals,	Westernised	
intellectuals	and	artists.49	Equally	strong	support	for	integration	
has	come	also	from	the	business	community,	which	benefits	from	
economic	cooperation	between	the	EU	and	Turkey.50	However,	EU	
aspirations	have	also	been	voiced	by	other	social	groups.	Accord-
ing	to	EDAM,	the	Centre	for	Economics	and	Foreign	Policy	Studies,	
48	 Turkish	critics	of	 the	AKP	government	have	also	pointed	out	 the	 increas-
ingly	widespread	attempts	by	the	conservative	segments	of	society	to	put	
pressure	on	individuals	who	do	not	display	their	commitment	to	Islam,	such	
as	urging	women	to	wear	headscarves.	Another	recent	development	which	
is	often	mentioned	in	this	context	is	a	positive	bias	in	the	workplace,	includ-
ing	public	offices,	towards	individuals	holding	conservative	views.
49	 For	example,	an	EDAM	survey	has	suggested	that	over	86%	of	 the	foreign	
policy	 experts	 are	 in	 favour	 of	Turkey’s	EU	membership	 (the	 survey	was	
carried	 on	 a	 sample	 of	 202	 experts).	 Türkiye’de	 ve	Dis	 Politika	Kamuoyu	
Anketleri	2013/1,	http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAMAnketOcak2013.pdf	
50	 Turkey’s	 influential	 business	 associations	 (especially	 TUSIAD	 and	 TOBB)	
have	been	actively	promoting	Turkey’s	 integration	with	 the	EU,	and	have	
lobbied	Brussels	to	that	end.
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the	highest	support	for	the	continuation	of	negotiations	is	among	
conservative	BDP	voters	(88%51),	despite	this	being	the	most	con-
servative	electorate.	This	confirms	the	results	of	an	opinion	poll	
conducted	by	TESEV,	which	suggest	that	support	for	integration	
with	the	EU	is	the	strongest	in	Turkey’s	conservative	eastern	and	
south-eastern	regions.52	The	second	most	pro-EU	electorate	is	the	
conservative	AKP	electorate.	Support	for	EU	membership	among	
AKP	voters	is	above	the	national	average.	Turkey’s	EU	integration	
has	also	been	actively	promoted	by	the	highly	influential	spiritual	
leader	Fethullah	Gülen	and	his	movement,	through	popular	me-
dia	and	education	activities,	among	other	means.53	This	therefore	
puts	the	suggestion	of	an	inverse	relation	between	conservatism	
and	support	for	the	EU	in	doubt.
It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 support	 for	 EU	 accession	
among	 Turkey’s	 conservative	 circles	 –	 for	 example,	 among	 the	
Kurds	 and	 within	 Fethullah	 Gülen’s	 movement	 –	 is	 motivated	
largely	by	the	hope	that	European	integration	would	lead	to	the	
final	dismantling	of	the	Kemalist	system	that	these	segments	of	
society	perceive	 as	 a	 threat.	 It	 therefore	 follows	 that	 their	 sup-
port	for	EU	integration	does	not	necessarily	indicate	the	pursuit	
of	EU-style	liberal	democratic	principles.	It	is	likely	that	over	time	
the	 pro-EU	 orientation	 of	 these	 groups	will	 gradually	 diminish	
because	 the	 main	 restrictions	 imposed	 on	 religious	 life	 by	 the	
Kemalist	 system	 will	 have	 already	 been	 abolished	 by	 the	 AKP	
51	 The	BDP	is	 interested	in	representing	the	interests	of	the	Kurdish	minor-
ity.	Such	strong	support	for	EU	integration	among	the	BDP	electorate	might	
reflect	the	Kurds’	belief	that	EU	membership	would	force	Ankara	to	grant	
them	political	and	cultural	rights	and	would	protect	them	against	Turkish	
nationalism.	Türkiye’de	Ve	Dis	Politika	Kamuoyu	Anketleri	2013/1,	http://
edam.	org.tr/document/EDAMAnketOcak2013.pdf
52	 Mensur	Akgün,	Sabiha	Senyücel	Gündoğar,	Aybars	Görgülü,	Erdem	Aydın,	
Foreign	 Policy	 Perceptions	 in	 Turkey,	 TESEV,	 2011,	 http://www.tesev.org.
tr/Upload/Publication/d40ab847-5676-4864-8f99-37fcb58ffc34/Foreign%20
Policy%20Perceptions%20in%20Turkey_05.2011.pdf
53	 See	http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/8256/12/.	The	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	
tactics	used	by	this	movement	have	not	adhered	to	democratic	principles.
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government.	As	a	result,	the	EU’s	role	as	a	guardian	of	civil	liber-
ties	might	no	longer	be	so	important.	The	same	will	apply	to	the	
Kurdish	minority:	as	the	Kurds	receive	more	rights	and	the	east-
ern	parts	of	Turkey	are	demilitarised,	the	significance	of	the	EU	
will	be	weakened.	The	pace	of	deterioration	of	the	EU’s	image	is	
likely	to	pick	up	as	Turkish	public	opinion	becomes	convinced	of	
Europe’s	bias	against	Islam.
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summAry  
the perception of europe And the future 
of turKey’s europeAn policy
It	 is	 not	 clear	whether	 the	 government	 in	Ankara	 still	 believes	
that	Turkey’s	EU	accession	 is	 a	 real	possibility.	 It	 appears,	how-
ever,	that	the	benefits	of	continuing	the	process	of	European	in-
tegration	will	urge	the	AKP	not	to	abandon	the	negotiations.	The	
government	will	try	to	avoid	potential	crises	in	bilateral	relations,	
and	should	such	crises	occur,	to	mitigate	their	outcome.	Erdogan’s	
government	sees	the	process	of	integration	with	the	EU	as	a	useful	
tool	for	achieving	economic	goals,	both	in	domestic	politics	and	on	
the	international	stage.
It	seems	that	this	approach	could	be	especially	important	for	Tur-
key’s	economy.	The	AKP	sees	Europe	as	its	key	and	most	promis-
ing	economic	partner,	which	will	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	coun-
try’s	 development,	 and	 in	 turn	 strengthen	 its	 position	 on	 the	
political	 and	 international	 stage.	The	 relatively	 strong	 relation-
ship	between	the	 intensity	of	 this	cooperation	and	the	status	of	
the	 integration	 process	will	 highlight	 the	 benefit	 of	 continuing	
the	negotiations.
The	role	of	 the	 integration	process	 for	 the	AKP’s	position	 in	do-
mestic	politics	has	changed	in	recent	years.	The	role	of	the	process	
as	an	 instrument	 in	political	competition	or	as	a	pretext	 for	re-
forms	has	weakened.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	government	
is	aware	that	abandoning	the	integration	talks	would	undermine	
its	position	on	the	political	scene.	Erdoğan’s	government	is	likely	
to	try	to	reduce	this	risk	by	diminishing	the	role	of	the	European	
Union	as	a	tutor	of	Turkey’s	democratisation.	First	and	foremost,	
however,	the	government	will	try	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	such	
a	crisis.	Any	criticism	directed	at	the	European	Union	should	be	
considered	 as,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 an	 expression	 of	 exasperation	
with	 its	 policy	 towards	 Turkey,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 as	 a	 way	 for	
Ankara	 to	 abdicate	 responsibility	 for	 the	 lack	of	progress	 in	 its	
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accession	 talks	with	 the	EU.	Most	 likely,	however,	 the	criticism	
will	not	be	 followed	by	any	concrete	actions	 that	could	actually	
weaken	Turkey’s	ties	with	the	EU.
For	the	AKP,	a	complete	breakdown	in	Turkey’s	integration	pro-
cess	with	the	European	Union	would	be	highly	undesirable.	None-
theless,	such	a	scenario	could	not	be	ruled	out	if	the	EU	were	to	
openly	question	the	AKP’s	credibility	as	a	democratic	and	reform-
ist	 political	 force.	 This	would	 leave	Erdoğan’s	 government	 little	
room	for	manoeuvre,	and	it	is	possible	that	in	such	a	scenario	An-
kara	would	take	measures	to	delegitimise	the	EU.
The	 EU	 integration	 process	 does	 not	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	
boosting	 Turkey’s	 standing	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 Its	 sig-
nificance	in	this	context	is	limited	to	raising	Turkey’s	prestige	as	
a	modern	democratic	state.	In	fact,	the	main	benefits	of	Turkey’s	
ties	with	Europe	come	from	its	NATO	membership	and	from	its	
bilateral	 cooperation	 with	 individual	 European	 states.	 Both	 of	
these	depend	only	slightly	on	the	status	of	Turkey’s	negotiations	
with	the	EU.	It	therefore	follows	that	international	affairs	will	not	
be	an	important	factor	 in	mobilising	the	AKP	to	persevere	with	
the	talks.	We	may	expect	Ankara	to	continue	pursuing	an	asser-
tive	foreign	policy,	which	will	at	times	depart	from	the	position	
held	by	the	EU	and	its	member	states.
A	growing	challenge	for	the	future	of	EU-Turkish	relations	is	the	
drastically	deteriorating	 image	of	Europe	among	Turkish	public	
opinion.	If	this	trend	continues	–	which	is	rather	likely	consider-
ing	the	durability	of	the	factors	that	cause	it	–	there	is	a	real	risk	
that	the	negative	perception	of	Europe	will	take	deep	root	among	
Turkish	 society.	 This	would	 reduce	 the	 EU’s	 influence	 over	 the	
position	of	the	AKP	on	the	political	stage,	since	the	EU	would	no	
longer	have	the	capacity	to	delegitimise	the	Turkish	government.	
Consequently,	 assuming	 that	 the	 government	 in	 Ankara	 con-
tinues	to	take	public	opinion	into	account	when	shaping	its	 for-
eign	policy,	and	that	the	image	of	Europe	in	Turkey	deteriorates	
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further,	economic	cooperation	and	the	AKP’s	ideological	commit-
ment	to	the	idea	of	EU	integration	will	remain	the	only	links	be-
tween	the	AKP	and	Europe.
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including the chancellery  
of the president of the Republic 
of poland, the chancellery  
of the prime Minister, ministries 
and government agencies,  
as well as the Sejm and Senate  
of the Republic of poland.
We are particularly active in 
discussions concerning the 
European Union’s Eastern policy, 
challenges to energy security,  
as well as the political, social 
and economic transformation 
processes in countries 
neighbouring poland.
Many of our publications are 
available online at: osw.waw.pl
Publication series
Point of View – short analytical studies 
presenting the opinions of our experts  
on current policy issues, published in 
polish and in English.
oSw Studies – large analytical studies 
devoted to major political, social  
and economic processes taking place  
in OSW’s area of interest; published in 
polish and in English.
OSW newsletters
eaSTweeK – a weekly analytical 
newsletter on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
the caucasus and central Asia 
(published in polish as Tydzień na 
wschodzie).
CeweeKlY (central European Weekly) – 
a weekly analytical newsletter on the 
Baltic States, central Europe, germany 
and the Balkans (published in polish as 
BeST oSw).
oSw Commentary – a series of more 
in-depth analyses concerning the most 
important events and developments in 
our area of interest (published in polish  
as Komentarze oSw).
OSW newsletters are available free of 
charge, subject to subscription
